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Retail Pricing, the Time Distribution
of Transactions, and Clearance Sales
ABSTRACT
Sellers of new products are faced with having to guess demand conditions
to set price appropriately. But sellers are able to adjust price over time
and to learn from past mistakes. Additionally, it is not necessary that all
goods be sold with certainty. It is sometimes better to set a high price and
to risk no sale. This process is modeled to explain retail pricing behavior
and the time distribution of transactions. Prices start high and fall as a
function of time on the shelf. The initial price and rate of decline can be
predicted and depends on thinness of the market, the proportion of customers
who are "window shoppers," and other observable characteristics. In a simple
case, when prices are set optimally, the probability of selling the product is
constant over time. Among the more interesting predictions is that women's
clothes may sell for a higher average price than men's clothes, given similar
cost, even in a competitive market. Another is that the initial price level
and the rate of price decline are positively related to the probability of
selling the good. Other observable relationships are discussed.
Edward P. Lazear
Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637A large department store wants to sell a "one—of--a—kind" designer gown.
Althoughthe manager has some ideaabout the pricethat thegowncan command,
there isgenerally some guesswork associated with the process. How should he
choosehis initial price? If the dress does not sell at that price after the
firstfew weeks on the rack, he has the option of trying a new price, when
does he change price and how does the new price relate to the old? How does
the decision depend on the characteristics of the gown and on conditions in
the clothing market? Is the gown more likely to sell during the first few
weeks on the rack, is the pattern of expected transactions smooth over time,
or do most sales occur later, when the seller is most frantic about getting
rid of the gown?
Firms face a very similar problem when they market a new product that is
not unique. Imagine a computer firm that introduces a new model. How should
the firm select a time path of prices for the computer, recognizing that the
company is not completely certain about the market for the new item? Is it
best to start with a high price and lower it over time, or should it do the
reverse? Are there any circumstances for which a constant price over time is
the appropriate strategy? How is its price contingent on the number of sales
made in the first days that the product is on the market? Are the number of
transactions likely to be larger at the beginning and then taper off, or might
they be smooth over time? How do these patterns vary with the characteristics
of the goods and the nature of the buyers? When does the firm announce a
"clearance sale," which is an attempt to move merchandise at a price
(significantly) below its original price?
This paper provides a simple framework that permits the analysis of these
issues. It is an attempt to explain pricing and transaction patterns over
time. A number of market phenomena are explained. Among the more interesting
ones are:—2—
1.Differences in pricing behavior by characteristics of the goods.
For example, it is commonly alleged that women's clothes are more
expensive than men's clothes, given cost conditions. Also, "designer" items
often carry extremely high initial prices, which fall rapidly if the good does
not sell. If men's suits do not exhibit such volatile price behavior, what
might explain this pattern? What does "fashion" have to do with this and is
there an objective definition of "fashion" that yields predictions?
2. Prices maybemore or less variable depending upon the thinness of
the market.
For some items, say, a $2 million mansion, transactions are relatively
rare events. How does the pricing of these infrequently traded items differ
fromthat of goods that turn over often?
3. 1X strategies vary with the uniqueness of the good?
tsignerdresses and Picasso paintings are unique. One andonly one item
ofits exact type is for sale. But there are many copies of a new computer
model and the sale of one machine does not preclude the sale of another
identical one to another buyer. How does pricing and selling strategy differ
in these two cases?
4. Price reduction policies as a function of time on the shelf.
Some famous department stores have an announced policy of halving the
price of an item for each week that it remains on the floor. Such "bargain
basement"behavior canbepredicted and the price cutting rule can be speci-
fied as well. When is a rigid nile of this sort an optimal pricing policy?
Thegoalis to relate these pricing and selling strategiesto underlying,
observable characteristics of the market in order to explain the differences.
Factorsrelating to theheterogeneity of the goods, the heterogeneity of buyer
preferences,and search costs are discussed.—3—
The ideabehind the model is that the ability to sell goods over time
allows richer strategies for two reasons. First, if the good does not sell
during the first period, the seller still has a chance of selling it during
the next period. Second, the outcome of the first period provides the second—
period seller with additional information. The amount and nature of that
informationdepends on the characteristicsof the market and the number and
attributesof the buyers. This can be modeled in a very easy way and all of
thequestions posed above can be addressed.1
A distinction that plays an important role is the one between the
expected selling price and the expected revenue associated with a good. The
former is the price, conditional on a sale. The latter takes into account
that a sale does not always occur. It generally pays to set prices in away
that sometimes leaves the good unsold at the end of the period.
The most important point to bear in mind is that this is a model of
"retailing." Retailing, as defined in this paper, describes a selling pattern
with anaimounced price that is maintained for some period of time. The
seller agrees implicitly to sell to the first person (or in thecaseof non—
uniquegoods, to any person) who comes along and is willing to pay that price.
The good sells at the stated price. No haggling occurs and auctions, which
pit one buyer against another, are not held. Since the analysis and some
results bear a close relation to the auction literature, some comparisons are
made below. Although the retailing paradigm is taken as given and exogenous,
some attempt to explain why retailing is used over other selling schemes is
presented in that section as well.
The design of the paper is to start with the simplest model and then to
introduce complications as necessary to explain the data. The effects of
market competition and strategic behavior of buyers are all considered in
turn.—4—
I. Intertemporal vs. Single—Period Pricing
The ability to change price after the first attempt to sell the product
fails produces a richer set of strategies andchangesthe problem facing the
firm. To see this, let us begin withthemost basic characterization of the
firm's pricing problem in a single—period context.
A. A One-Period Model
Suppose that the firm will encounter one and only one buyer who is
willing to pay V for the good, but no more. The firm does not know V with
certainty, but has some prior notion of the density of V denoted f(V) with
distribution function F(v).2 (The prior may be based on an examination of the
selling prices of similar goods, but for now, its source is unimportant.) The
risk—neutral firm's problem is to maximize expected profits or
(1) Max R[1 —F(R)]
R
where R is the price and1 —F(R)is the probability that V exceeds R
so that a sale is made. For the purposes of expositional simplicity, suppose
that the prior on V is uniform between zero and ones Then F(R)R so
that the optimumis at R=1/2,yielding expected profits of 1/4.
An alternative formulation is that the firm has a large number of simi-
lar, but not identical items that it wishes to sell. It knows that the
distribution of demand prices is given by f(V), but it does not know which
items correspond to high values and which to low. An example is a line of
dresses, which come in different colors or have different trim. Ex ante, the
seller does not know whether it is the yellow or the red one that has V =1.
The one—period pricing rule is again, set R =1/2.—5-.
B. A Two-Period Model
Now suppose instead that if the good does not sell during the first
period, the seller faces another buyer during the second period who is
identical to the one he saw during the first period. The firm now has two
chances to sell the good. Furthermore, the failure of the good to sellin
period 1 at price R1 tells the seller something about the V. In this
simple case, it implies that V < R, because if V > R1, the good would
have sold.3
Using Bayes' Theorem, this implies that the posterior distribution which
the firm carries into period 2 is uniform between 0 and R1Isothat
the posterior distribution, =V/R1.The choice of affects the
problem in two ways. First, it affects the probability of a sale in period 1.
Second, it determines what the firm can infer from no sale. For example, if
=1,then the fact that the good did not sell is uninformative because the
firm wascertainthat V < 1 at the outset. Similarly, R1 =0is certain
to result in a sale during the first period so there is no learning that
occurs with this choice either.
The firm's problem then is to choose R1 andR2 where R2 is the
price that the firm tries in period 2, given that the good did not sell in
period 1. In this example, the good is unique so that a sale in period 1
eliminates any concern about period 2. That problem can be written as:





The first term is the price charged in period 1 times the probability that the
good sells in period 1 •Thesecond term is the price charged in period 2
times the probability of a sale in period 2 at that price, given the
information from period 1, times the probability that the good does not sell
in period 1.—6—
Itis instructive to think of this as a dynamic programming problem and
to consider the firm's optimal strategy in period 2, given that the good did
not sell in period 1 at the price R1. The firm's problem in period 2 is
(3) Max R2[1 —F2(R2)]
R2




whichhas an optimum at R2 =(R1)/2.
This makes obviousintuitive sense. For any given R1, ifthe good did
not sell during the first period, then the seller can rule out the possibility
that V >R1The distribution that the seller uses in period 2 is uniform
between zero and R, so the second period's problem is equivalent to the one
facing a firm with only one period to sell and with a prior between 0 and
R1. The solution to that problem is to select =(R1)/2•
Thus, for any given R1, if the good remains unsold after one period,
the rule is to cut the price in half next period. (This halving is specific
to the assumed distribution, of course.) Substitution of =(R1)/2into
(2) and maximizing with respect to R1 yields4
R1 =2/3
= = 1/3
This illustrates a number of important points, First, prices fall over
time. A retailer puts a gown on the market at a high price (a1= 2/3),
hoping that it will sell at that price. If it does not sell, he can revise
his price downward during the next period. The reverse pattern would never be
optimal because once the gown sold at 1/3, the seller has eliminated the—7—
chance that he will get 2/3 for it. (If V >2/3,then it exceeds 1/3 as
well so period 2becomes irrelevant since no gown that will sell inperiod 2
isever available after period i.) Stated alternatively, the gowns in the
"prettiest" colors with V >2/3sell in period 1. The seller must revise
downward his opinion of the value of remaining gowns. The distributionat the
beginningof period 2has lower value gowns than those at the start of period
1because the best ones have already been picked off.
This abstracts from any investment in brand name recognition associated
with charging a lower initial price. For example, new firms frequently charge
lower prices than their rivals to induce customers to try the new product.
The difference between the observed price and the optimal one as calculated in
this problem can be thought of as advertising and is ignored throughout. It
also abstracts from contagion or network effects. The value, V, is assumed
to be independent of the number of others who have similar items.6
Second, the comparison with the one—period solution is interesting.
There, the solution was to set price equal to 1/2. Now, because a
disappointed seller has another chance, a first—period price that exceeds 1/2
is justified.7 If he wanted to, he could always select a price of 1/2 during
the second period because he still has one chance left. Of course, given what
he has learned from period 1, a price of 1/2 is no longer optimal in round 2.
So the prices charged straddle the one period optimum.
Furthermore,expected profits are higher as a result of having a second
chance. In the one—period problem, expected profits were 1/4. In the two—
periodproblem, expected profits are 1/3(substitute R1 =2/3,R2 =2/3into
(3)).This is because the expected probability of a sale is higher in the





In the one—period problem, the expected probability of a sale was(1 —F(R))
=1/2.(The expected selling price is the same in both cases).8
C. Heterogeneous Consumers and Thin Markets
The previous problem was made simple because the inference problem was so
trivial.Ifthegood did not sell during the first period, the firmknewwith
certaintythat it overpriced the good. In reality, other factors make the
inference problem more difficult. Specifically, two factors are important.
Thefirst is the number of customers who come into the store during the first
period. Intuitively, if only a few customers arrive during the first period,
the firm should be less certain about its inference than if a large number
examine the good and reject it at price R1. Second, heterogeneity among
consumers may be important. If some consumers are willing to pay V, while
others will pay an amount below the firm's reservation price, then the problem
is more complicated. The good might not have sold not because the price was
toohigh,but because that period's customers were all of the wrong type.
Thiscan be parameterized as follows. Suppose that in period 1,N
"customers" examine the good. Of those, a proportion P are just "shoppers"
whosevalue of the good is less than the seller's reservation price, and
1 -Pare "buyers" who are willing to pay V. As before, v is unknown to
the seller and his goal is to select R1 andR2 to maximize profits, given
his prior beliefs on V. In what follows, "customers" refers to the total
number of individuals who inspect the good, "buyers" refers to the subset with
value equal to V, and "shoppers" refers to the subset with value equal to
zero. (Important is that a given individual does not know whether he is a—9—
buyer or shopper until he has inspected the good. No one who knew that he was
a shopper would ever bother to look.9)
Theproblem is similar to the one in (3) except for twopoints:First,
F2(V) is different here. Second, expected sales depend on P. More
formally, the seller wants to maximize
(4) Max R1(Prob. sale in 1) +R2(Posteriorprob. sale in 2)(Prob. no sale in 1)
R1 ,R2
Now, the probability of a sale in period 1 is
(1 —F(R1))(1
—pN)
because the probability that every customer is a shopper is pN so that
1 —Nis the probability of encountering at least one buyer. It only
requires one buyer to make the sale as long as R, < V. similarly, the
posterior probability of a sale in period 2 is
(1 —F2(R2))(1—pN)
and the probability of no sale in period 1 is
1 —((1—
F(R1))(1 pN)]
It is now necessary to derive F2(V)., Bayes' Theorem states that the
posterior probability is proportional to the probability of the sample, given
the parameter, times the prior probability of the parameter. The sample in
this case is the observation that no one bought during period 1. For V <
R1,
the probability of no purchase is 1. For v >R1there is only one reason
why the good did not sell during period 1 and that is that all customers were
shoppers. This happens with probability N,
It is easy to show that the normalization required to make the integral
of the density function equal to 1 is—10—
1/(R1(l —pN)+ pN)
so that the density is given by
(5) f(v) =






Integratingthis yields the distribution function
(6) F2(V)




R1) = forV>R .
R1(1
—PN)+N
To obtain the probability of a sale in period 2,(1 —F2(R2))must be
multipliedby (1 —P)sincethat is theprobabilitythat at least one buyer
isencountered in the group of customers.
Substitution of these expressions into (4) yields the following
maximizationproblem:
(7) MaxR1(1 —N(l_pN)Rl +R2(PN+(l_PN)R,_ R2](1 —pN)
R1 ,R2
As before, it is instructive to solve this as a dynamic programming
problem,deriving the optimal R2for any R1Igiventhat period 2 is
reached.This problem is written






Max R2[1 N Nj(1P )
R2 R1(1 —P)+P
Differentiatingwith respect to R2 and setting the derivative equal to zero—11—
yield the optimum R2 which is given by:
(9) R2=[R1(l_PN)+PNj.
When pN0, the problem in (7) and (8) reduces to the simpler problem,
which is a special case, considered earlier. Indeed, substitution of N =0
into (9) yields the earlier solution that R2 =(1/2)R1.








When pN =0so that the problem reduces to the simple one, the solution
is again R1 =2/3and =(1/2)(2/3)=1/3.As goes to 1, however,
the solution goes to R, =1/2and from (9), R2 =1/2.That is, as pN goes
to 1, prices remain constant over time.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. When pN =0,all
customers are buyers (there are no window shoppers) so the inference problem
becomes perfect. If the good is left on the shelf after the first period, it
can only be because the good was priced higher than V. Therefore, all V >
R1 can be ruled out. But as approaches 1, almost all of the customers
are merely shoppers. Thus, little can be inferred from the fact that no one
bought the good after the first period. Evn if R1 were less than V,
there is a very good chance that the good would still remain on the shelf
after one period in this climate of browsers. Under these circumstances,
having two consecutive periods is no different from having two independent
one—period problems, since nothing is learned from the first period. This—12—
implies that the solution to the single period problem, namely price =1/2,
applies in both periods.10




(13) =!{i — R + (1—pN)•__ij> 2 1
apN
Theimplication is that when pN is small prices start higher and fall more
rapidly with time unsold. For PN close to 1, prices tend to be constant
over time. Now, N has at least two real world interpretations.
First, N is the number of customers per period of times As N
increases, N gets small so that as N increases, prices start high and
fall more rapidly, when there are a lot of customers per period, there is
more information contained in the fact that the good did not sell so that the
strategy moves toward that used when perfect inference is available. On the
other hand, if N is small, less is learned from the fact that the good
remainsunsold after one round. This implies that theprices of goods in thin
marketsshould start lower and fallless rapidly (relative to the prior
distribution)than prices of goods where markets are dense.
Consider, for example, the problemof selling a house. Suppose there are
two different types of houses. One is a $2 million mansion. Such houses turn
over very infrequently and there are very few buyers. Another is a $50,000
high—rise condominium in a building where one of the 300 apartments is sold
weekly. The implication of this section is that prices of mansions should be
less sensitive to time on the market than prices of condominiums. The reason
is that the owner of the mansion cannot infer that his house was overpriced
from the fact that it has been on the market for two months without selling.—13—
There are very few potential buyers of mansions. But the owner of the
apartment can quickly and precisely infer that if the apartment did not sell
it is not because he encountered few buyers, but instead because it was
overpriced. Information comes with each genuine buyer and there are fewer of
theseper period of time in the case of mansions. This suggests that prices
of lower quality goods adjust more rapidly to time on the market during which
the good remains unsold.
The sale of a house does not quite fit this model, since theprocess is
oneof haggling over price, rather than strict retailing. Still, the intui-
tion of the example is appealing. Goods for which the markets are thin have
more rigid prices; "clearance sales" are less common. How isthin defined?
Since N is the numberof customers that any one seller faces, thinness must
be defined in some relative sense. Probably the most easily measured aspect
of thinness relates to thetransactionsper unit of time. Consider the house
example.Ifthere are 100 houses of the low—priced variety and 5 of the high—
pricedvariety,thenin equilibrium, 100 families live in the former and 5 in
the latter. Thinness would be the same unless each of the 100 turns overmore
frequently per unit of time. Suppose that those who live in the low-priced
typemove twice asoften as the high—price residents. Then the number of
customers that visit the low—priced houses per unit of time exceeds that at
thehigh—priced houses so an unambiguous measure of thinness can be obtained.
The secondinterpretation of pN relates to search cost and information.
For a given N, P is the proportion of customers who have a purchase price
below the seller's reservation price (in the example above, it was zero). If
customershave much information about thegood before they inspect it, then
few shoppers will show up and all of the customers will be buyers. Consider
wholesale versus retail buyers. It is possible (although not obviously true)
that purchasers in the wholesale market have better prior information than—14—
thosein the retail market. If true, this implies that wholesale prices fall
more rapidly with inventory time than retail prices because the seller at the
wholesale level can infer more than the seller at the retail level about his
pricing policy. What should be true under any circumstances, is that for a
given number of customers, an increase in the proportion of those who do not
buy after having examined the good reduces thespeedwithwhichprices fall.
Bothof these variables, the number of customers and the proportion who do not
buy after looking, are observable, at least conceptually.
Related to this is the idea that search costs are important in determin-
ingthe speed with which prices fall as a function of time on the shelf.
Consider a good for which search is costly, for example, a piece of land in
the middle of Alaska. Fbr a given number of customers, a very small propor-
tion will be window shoppers. Because inspection is so expensive, most who
inspect the good are likely to be buyers rather than shoppers. As such, the
sellerof that parcel of land can infer a great deal from the decision by any
customer not to purchase the land. Thus, the listing price of the land should
droprapidly each time a customer opts against purchase.
Contrastthis with a house in the middle of Chicago. The proportion of
shoppers—to—buyers is much higherhere because search costs are low. Even
individualswho are likely to value the good at zero rather than V may con-
sider taking a look to be certain. Thus, less can be inferred from a given
customer'sdecision not to buy the house. This implies that price is less
sensitive to N in Chicago than it is in Alaska. Of course, for a given
period of time, N, the number of customers, is likely to be higher for the
house in Chicago than for the land in Alaska. This means that prices may fall
more rapidly with time even though not with N for the house in Chicago.
Both time on the shelf and N are observable.—15—
Additionally, goods for which repeat purchases are made are likely to
have informed customers and sellers. The prior on V is tight and P is
likely to be small. More is said on this below.
D. Competition
Competition has not been mentioned in the preceding analysis. Implicit
in the fact that goods must be examined to assess value, is some expost
monopoly power that is created by the imperfect information. Still, most of
thegoods that are thesubject of this paper are sold in what would normally
bethought of as a competitive environment. How does competition affect the
story?
There are twowaysthat competition affectsthe analysis, Thefirst is
thatthe existence of competition is likely to alter the firm's prior. Even
with uncertainty in the world, a seller in a competitive market might reason-
ably assume that the distribution of V lies to the left of that for a seller
in a monopolistic market forthestandard reasons. If a perfect substitute
exists, and if all customers know its price, then no V in excess of that
price is feasible.
There is a more interesting way to think of competition in this context.
What is meant by competition is that even though firms may not be able to
compete directly on the exact good, (e.g., only one store may carry one
particular designer's latest dress), the customer's search is usually for a
good among a class of goods rather than for any one particular item. (E.g., a
woman is looking for a new party dress, not for Yves St. Laurent's latest.)
In this context, a key parameter, pN, has been assumed to beexogenous. But
competitiontends to make pN endogenous. Ex ante, stores are identical even
thoughthere may be some ex post differences. For example, a street may
contain ten art galleries, all of which look identical from the outside. But—16—
sincepaintingsare unique, each gallery has a different selection of
paintings. Positive profit in the gallery business causes more firms to enter
so that theNthat each firmseesfalls until expected profit equals zero.11
More formally, substitution of (9) and (11) into (7) yields the firm's
revenue function in terms of N• Differentiation with respect to pN yields
the obvious conclusion that expected revenue falls as pN rises.12 (When N =
1,revenue is zero because all customers are shoppers. When pN =0,
revenue is maximized because all customers are buyers and, so long as N
equals or exceeds 1, a sale is certain for R1<V.) Oneway tothinkabout
competitionis that firms enter the industry, reducing the per period flow
of N that any one firm faces until profits are driven to zero. Since
expected revenue falls when N falls (it moves inversely with PN),
competition reduces N until expected revenue equals costs.13
The competitive equilibriumyields some testable predictions onpricing.
Tothe extent that competition reduces profits to zero by decreasing N and
increasing pN, competition also affects the choice of initial price and its
fall over time. From (12), it is clear that increases in P11 as a result of
competition reduce R1 From (13), the same increase in N implies an
increase in R2. This implies that for the same prior on V,firmsin com-
petitive markets choose lower initial prices and reduce them less rapidly than
firms in monopolistic markets. Put differently, this suggests that prices are
more sensitive to inventory time in monopolistic markets than in competitive
ones.
This raises a more general point. Prices of, say, nonperishable items in
supermarkets do not seem to exhibit much time variation at all. How does the
model explain this phenomenon? Competition among supermarkets, which results
in higher pN, is capable of providing one explanation for the phenomenon.
But a more basic force is at work.—17—
Recall that the reason that prices fall over time is that learning has
taken place during the relevant period. The amount of learning that canoccur
depends on the dispersion in the prior on V. Butifthe same good has been
soldfor a long period of time, therelevant prior is likely to be extremely
tight.Thus, little learning occurs and prices remain rigid as a result.
Both factors, the length of the time horizon and the amount of dispersion in
the prior, are analyzed more rigorously below.
E. Observable Time Patterns of Price and Quantity
Thetheory yields predictions of pricing behavior as a function of three
factors:the number of customers, N; the proportion of customers who are
shoppers rather than buyers, P; and the firm's beliefs about the market,
parameterized through the prior on V. With the exception perhaps of the last
of the three, these variables are observable, at least in theory.However, it
is likely to prove quite difficult to obtain information on P and N.
Quite aside from data considerations, it is useful to be able to relate
price time paths and quantity time paths to some observable characteristics,
aswell as to each other, The relation of R1and R2 to P and N has
already been discussed. Recall that as goes from zero to one, H1 moves
from 2/3 to 1/2 and R2 moves from1/3 to 1/2: R1 falls and R2 rises so
the ratio of H1 to H2 falls as pN increases, i.e., as inference becomes
more difficult.
Thepattern of expected transactions over time is somewhat less
intuitive.The probability of a sale in period 1 is




The(unconditional) probability of a sale in period2 is
Prob(sa].e in 2R2, no sale in 1) •Prob(nosale in 1)
This is the second term of (7) without the price R2 as a scalar. Substitut-
ing (9) into this part of (7) yields
(15) Prob. sale in 2 =-- + (1—PN)R](l—




N N P +(1—P
)R1
After substituting (11) into this expression, the ratio reduces to 1. That
means that the unconditional probability of a sale in period 1 is equal to
that for period 2. Expected sales are smooth over time.
Additionally,since expected sales are equal in each period, the proba-
bility that the goodsells is given by twice the probability thatitsells in
period1 or by
prob. of sale =2(1—pN)(1—R1)





After substitution of (12), it can be shown that
a(Prob. of sale)<0.
ap








0.0000 0.6667 0.3333 0.3333 0.6667 2.0000
0.0500 0.6610 0.3390 0.3220 0.6441 1.9500
0.1000 0.6552 0.3448 0.3103 0.6207 1.9000
0.1500 0.6491 0.3509 0.2982 0.5965 1.8500
0.2000 0.6429 0.3571 0.2857 0.5714 1.8000
0.2500 0.6364 0.3636 0.2727 0.5455 1.7500
0.3000 0.6296 0.3704 0.2593 0.5185 1.7000
0.3500 0.6226 0.3774 0.2453 0.4906 1.6500
0.4000 0.6154 0.3846 0.2308 0.4615 1.6000
0.4500 0.6078 0.3922 0.2157 0.4314 1.5500
0.5000 0.6000 0.4000 0.2000 0.4000 1.5000
0.5500 0.5918 0.4082 0.1837 0.3673 1.4500
0.6000 0.5833 0.4167 0.1667 0.3333 1.4000
0.6500 0.5745 0.4255 0.1489 0.2979 1.3500
0.7000 0.5652 0.4348 0.1304 0.2609 1.3000
0.7500 0.5556 0.4444 0.1111 0.2222 1.2500
0.8000 0.5455 0.4545 0.0909 0.1818 1.2000
0.8500 0.5349 0.4651 0.0698 0.1395 1.1500
0.9000 0.5238 0.4762 0.0476 0.0952 1.1000
0.9500 0.5122 0.4878 0.0244 0.0488 1.0500
1.0000 0.5000 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
The relationships illustrated in table 1 provide empirically testable
predictions. As PN goes from zero to one, the price ratio, R1/R2, falls.
Similarly, as goes from zero to one the probability of an eventual sale
falls. This implies that in markets where prices fall rapidly as a function
of time on the shelf, the probability that the good will go unsold is rela—
tively low. The prediction in the housing sample is that mansions, for which
pN is high, should have slowly declining prices and should be more likely to
be taken of f the market after an unsuccessful attempt to sell than inexpensive
condos, for which is low.
This implication is not an obvious one. Since Rj/R2 is high when
R1
is high, the logic implies that for a given prior, goods for which price—20—
starts high are actually more likely to sell. The reason is that the high
initialprice reflects low PN. It is not a matterof calling out prices
randomly, The high initial price is a response to conditions that also imply
that a sale is likely.
Note that the expected price at which the good sells is always 1/2,
irrespective of t•Thisfollows because (prob. sale in 1)/(prob. sale in 2)
=1and because (R1 +R2)/2=.5.This also illustrates the important
distinction between the expected price at which a good sells and expected
revenue. Although expected price, given a sale is independent of pM,
expectedrevenue falls with• N•Theprobability that the good remains unsold
(and is returned to the supplier as scrap) increases with pN The point that
not all goods are sold and that there is a systematic relationship between
pricing and the probability of a sale is fundamental to this analysis. It
plays an essential role in reconciling some phenomena described below,
F. Recapitulation
Theability to readjust price as a function of past sales provides the
firm with a richer strategy set.Thisis especially important when the firm
is more uncertain about the value that consumers attach to the good in ques-
tion. Not only does intertemporal pricing permit more than one chance to
attract buyers, but it also allows the firm to learn about the nature of
demand in the market,
An important implication is that prices start high and fall with time on
theshelf, The level of initial price andspeed with which pricefalls are
positively related to the number of customers that it encounters per period
and to the proportion of real "buyers" in the group. Thin markets have lower
initial and more rigid prices.—21—
Competition among firms for customers reduces the number of potential
buyersthat any one seller encounters. This drives profits to zero, but in
the process, alters the optimal pricing rule. Department stores that sell
somewhat distinct items will select lower initial prices and lower those
prices more slowly when there is competition between stores for buyers. This
is true even when the good in question is available at only one store.
The time pattern of transactions tends to be smooth over time. The
probability that the good eventually sells is positively related to initial
price and the rate of price decline along the optimal price trajectory.
II. Heterogeneous Goods, Fashion, Obsolescence and Discount Rates
This section builds on the earlier ones to explain how prices vary with
factors like product heterogeneity, obsolescence rates and time discounting.
In most of this section, it will be assumed that all customers are buyers,
that is, that P =0so that the less complex formulation of the model can be
used.
A. Heterogeneity Among Goods
Is there any sense to the claim that women's clothes cost more than
men's, even for given cost conditions? This is a direct implication of
different product heterogeneity across the type of good.
Formally, what this section examines is how dispersion in the prior on V
affects pricing policy and the probability that a sale is made. Assume that
P =0sothat the firm's problem becomes the one in (2) (which is the special
case of (4) with P =0).
Consider a mean preserving spread. For expositional convenience, let us
be specific. Suppose that the prior on V for, say, men's clothes, is
uniform between .5 and 1.5, but for women, it is uniform between 0 and 2.(We—22—
ignorethe endogeneity of the prior throughout.) Theideais that to the
extent that men's clothes take on more variations, it is more difficult to
predictthe value of any particular item. Both distributions have the same
mean value and itwouldseem that average prices, average revenues, and
expectedrevenues might be the same. This is not the case.
Given the distributions, the prior distribution function for men's
clothes is
(16a) F(V) =V—1/2for 1/2 < V< 3/2
and this results in a posterior for any given R1 of
(16b) F2(V) =(V—1/2)/(R1—1/2)for 1/2<V<R1
Similarly, the prior for women's clothes is
(17a) F(V) =V/2for O<V<2
and this results in a posterior for any given R1 of
(1 7b) F2(V) =V/R1for 0 < V <
Substitution of (17a,b) into (2) yields the solution that the initial
price for women's clothing, R1, equals 4/3 and the period 2 price,R2, is
2/3. This makes sense since the prior on V is simply a rescaling of the
originalprior, where solutions were 2/3, 1/3.
Substitution of (16a,b) into (2) yields the solution that the initial
price of men's clothing, R1, equals 1 and the period 2 price,R2, is 1/2.
Note that the period 2 price is the lower bound of the posterior (and prior)
distributions so that the optimum in this case is to make the sale a certainty
in period 2.(Of course, this result is dependent on the shape of the density
function.)—23—
Given the prices and the priors, it is obvious that the probability that
the woman's garment sells at 4/3 is 1/3 and the (unconditional) probability
that it sells at 2/3 is also 1/3. This results in an expected price of 1, and
the good is sold 2/3 of the time so expected revenue is 2/3.
For men's clothes, the probability that the garment sells at R1 =1is
1/2 and the probability that it sells at 1/2 is also 1/2. The expected price
is 3/4 and expected revenue is 3/4.
Although this is only one example, it illustrates a number of important
points:First, themore disperse prior results in a higher expected price for
agivenmean. Thus, women's clothes cost more than men's clothes. Second,
because women's clothes remain unsold more often than men's clothes, expected
revenues can be lower, even though the price, given a sale, is higher. In
competitjon, firms enter the men's clothing industry until expected revenue is
equal across sectors. In the more general model, where P0, this
reinforces the result that men's clothes sell for lower prices. The key to
this result is that at the optimum prices, more women's clothes remain
unsold. The seller either retains the good (as in the case of an unsold
house), or wholesales it off.
A similar story might apply to goods that are very new or rapidly
changing over time. 'lb the extent that the prior is more diffuse for these
goods,their prices should start higher, but fall faster than those on more
traditional items. This predicts more variance over time in the prices of new
computers than in the prices of standard typewriters. Another reason for high
price variance in the computer market may be the importance of obsolescence.
The next section examines that issue.
As an empirical matter, economists who construct price indexes tend to
focus on the price, given a sale, and ignore the probability of a transaction.—24—
What this points out is that pricing and sale probabilities are linked. For
many purposes, when the probability of a sale is less than one, expected
revenue—per—good might be a better metric than expected price, given a sale.
The former is more closely related to what the firm generally cares about,
even though the latter is what consumers care about.
B. Fashion, Obsolescence and Discounting the Future
Somegoodsgo out of style very quickly whereas others seem to retain
their popularity for long periods of time. Again, the example of men's and
women'sclothes maybe relevant. It may be true that men's suits change lapel
widthslessfrequently than women's clothes change style. That phenomenon is
assumed exogenous for the purposes of this paper, but it is interesting to
know how fashion, or obsolescence as it might be termed in other markets,
affects the choice of initial price and the rigidity of prices over time.
This is easily treated in the current framework. Let us think of
obsolescence or fashion as taking the following form: tiring the first priod,
the good is worth V, but in the second period it is worth V/K, where
K > 1•Theseller still does not know V, but he does know that whatever it
is, it will retain only 1/K of its worth in period 2.
All that changes is the value that is inserted into the period 2 density












Assuming that the prior is uniform between zero and one, the optimum prices





For K =1,the solutions are identical (as they must be) to those obtained
without obsolescence, namely, R1 =2/3,R2 1/3.
What is clear from (19a) is that prices fall faster with time on the
shelf when K is large. The reason, of course, is that the seller knows that
if the good was worth V in period 1 it is only worth V/K in period 2, so
period 2's price adjusts accordingly.
Equally intuitive is that the price in period 1 is lower when K is
large. The more obsolete the good becomes, the more anxious is the seller to
get rid of it in period 1. As a result, he trades off this sense of urgency
against the price that would provide him with the best posterior to carry into
period 2.
Stated alternatively, a "classic," defined as a good that does not go out
of style, carries a higher initial price, independent of any resale considera-
tions. Its price is less sensitive to inventory than a good that goes out of
style rapidly. This is true even for a given set of cost conditions.
Time discounting, although seemingly similar, is somewhat different. The
reason is that even though the seller might think of a sale in period 2 at
V as worth only V/K in present value, the posterior density function is
still on V. not V/K because buyers are willing to pay V in period 2.
Thus, the objective function is not (18), but is instead
(20) Max R1(1 —F(R1))+2r)
(1 F2(R1))F(R1)
R1 ,R2—26—
thepresent value of the period 2 price is R2/(l +r),but the customer
continues to buy the good as long as V >R2The solution when Vis




Note that R2 R1/2' which differs from (19a). The price does not
fall more rapidly when the discount rate is positive. This isas it should
be. Given that the firm gets to period 2, the best that it can do is takethe
information from period 1 (that V <R1) and optimize. Discounting is
irrelevant to that decision. This was not true when the good became obsolete
in the second period.
But implications about urgency are similar. As r gets large, the firm
is anxious to make the sale in period 1, not because the good will become
obsolete, but for reasons of time preference. At the extreme, as rgoes to
infinity, R1 =1/2.The value of the second period is zero so the firm
behaves as it would in the one—period problem, settingR1 =1/2.But if it
does get to period 2, the best policy now is to cut price to1/4 because it
knows (with certainty) that V < 1/2.
Time discounting reduces the initial price, but does notchange the rate
at which prices fall as a function of time on the shelf. Obsolescence reduces
the initial price too, but also increases the rate at which prices fallas a
function of time on the shelf.
C. LongerHorizons
Twoperiodshave been assumed throughout theanalysis.Time discounting
wasone way to modify that assumption, but it is useful to consider more—27—
directly how a change in time horizon affects pricing strategy. In many
respects, this is another way to treat obsolescence, but there is more to it
than that.
Consider a firm that has T rather than 2 periods during which to sell
its product. The problem in (2) generalizes to
(22) Max R1[1 —F(R1)]+ R2[1 —F2(R2)]F(R1)+ R3[1 —
F3(R3)JF(R2)
R1 ,R2, .. .,R
+ •ø•+'Tt —FT(RT)JF(RT1)
where Ft(v) is the posterior after t —1periods. As before, F(V)
refers to the prior distribution before period 1. ch term on the right—hand
side has as one of its components F(Rt_i) because this is the probability
that the good was not sold before period t. The problem yields a system of
recursive first—order conditions given by
(23) =i— +R2 =0





These yield the general solution that
(24a) =1/(T+ 1)
(24b) Rt =CT-t+ l)RT =T-t+ 1
These solutions are quite intuitive. First, as T gets large so that
the horizon lengthens, eq. (24a) implies that the price in the last period
goes to zero. Second, eq. (24b) implies that price drops by a smaller amount—28—
each period with increases in T. Thus, price changes less rapidly per period.
But the initial price is higher as T increases so that a larger total range
of prices is covered. As T goes to infinity, R1 =T/(T+1)goes to 1.
The price starts at the top and moves down trivially each period until V is
hit precisely. As T goes to 1, we are back to the one-period problem and
R1 is 1/2.
Stated simply, as the firm's selling horizon lengthens, initial price is
higher and prices fall off less rapidly each period. }owever, the price in
the final period is lower as the time horizon increases. This also implies
that the probability that the good sells before the end is reached increases
in T because 1F(RT) increases in T.
The difference between adding periods and merely lengthening the time
associated with each period is that learning takes place and a new price can
be chosen each period. This comes back to an essential feature of "retailing"
as defined in this paper. The price is fixed for a given length of time
(which is likely to depend on the number of customers encountered per unit of
time). Price changes only occur at the end of that interval. No attempt is
made to call out the highest possible price, and lower it until the customer
agrees to purchase. There are good reasons for not doing this, and those
reasons are discussed below.
D. Non—unique Goods
There is another respect in which the time horizon can be lengthened.
The situation that many firms face in marketing new products is somewhat
different from the one analyzed so far. above, it was assumed that once the
good is sold, there are no others to sell. This is appropriate for a painting
or designer dress, but what of a new computer model put out by an established
company? The fact that the good sells in the first period does not preclude—29—
additional sales in the second period. How should the prices be set under
these circumstances?
Again, for simplicity, return to the two—period horizon problem and
continue to assume that P =0:all customers are buyers. Now, three prices
are relevant: The seller must select a price in period 1,Ri; he must choose
a price in period 2 given that no purchases were made in period 1, 2; and
he must choose a price in period 2 given that at least one purchase was made
in period 1, R2. (Under the assumptions about consumer homogeneity, knowing
the exact number of items sold provides no additional information,14
Normalize such that one item is available for sale in period 1 and N2
are available in period 2. If no sale occurs in period 1, then N2 +1are
available. N2 may be greater or less than1.The preceding analysis of
unique goods is merely a special case, with N20. The firm's maximization
can be written as
(25)
R
Max. R(i —F(R))+(N+1)R(1 —F(R))F(R)+NR(i—F(R))(1—F(R))
1' 2' 2
It is especially revealing to treat this as a dynamic program and to
examine what happens if the good sells in period 1.
The second—period problem is
(26) Max N2R2(1 —i2(R2))
R2
Again, using Bayes' Theorem
=0 for V<R1
f(V) =
1—F(R) forV > R1
so 1






for V > R1 .—30—
The maximization in (26) becomes
(27a) Max N2R2 if R2 < R1




Branch (27a) is always increasing in R2 so if the solution is on this
branch,it is at 12 =R1.If >R1,then the first—order condition for
(27b) is relevant:







Thissolution is identical to that of the one-period problem. But the
optimal price in the one—period problem can never exceed R1, so the corner
is relevant here, too. Thus, the solution is 12 =R,,
Thisimplies that price in the second periodnever rises, even if the
goodsells during the first period. The reason is that the part of the
distribution below R1isirrelevant anyway, soknowing that v > R1 does
notchange the decision on the optimal price.
Given that R2 =
R1,and using the definition of (v) eq. (26) can
be rewritten as
Max R1(1 —F(R1))+ (N2+ 1)R2(1 —F2(R2))F(R1)+ N2R1(1 —F(R1))
R1 ,R2
or
Max (N2+ 1)R1(1 —F(R1))+ (N2+ 1)R2(1 —F2(R2))F(R1)
R1 ,R2
Since the scalar (N2+ 1) is irrelevant, this problem is identical to
the one in (2), where goods were assumed to be unique. Thus, all results—31—




If some sales are made in period 1, then price is held at R1 Ifno sales
are made, then price is halved.15
E. Spoiling the Market and Nondurable Goods
The result that the price following a successful period 1 never falls
hinges on the assumption that demanders who find the price too high in period
1, return for another look in period 2.(If no sale occurs, there are N2+ 1
buyers in period 2.) This is an inappropriate assumption in t obvious
cases.The first is that buyers lose interest when they find that R1>v.
Thismaybe rational when buyers do not know the firm's prior so that they
cannotforecast its pricecutting behavior. The second is that the good is
nondurable. For example, a hotel room that was vacant on Saturday night can-
not be stored and sold again on Sunday.



























If N2 1so that demand is constant over time, R1 =4/7,instead of 2/3
as obtained before. The reason is that losing a sale in period 1 is nowmore
costly since the market is spoiled for that buyer, so the firm selects a lower
first—period price. The learning effect, which is still present, is offset to
some extent by the desire to avoid having first—period buyers walkaway
without buying. It is not offset completely becauseR1 >1/2,so this is
notthe same as consecutive one—period problems. Even though the good isnot
storable,the information derived from period 1 is,so sellers of nondurab].es
donot behave myopically. As N2 gets large, R1 approaches 2/3 because the
lostsales in period 1 are trivial, relative to revenue generated inperiod 2.
The information effect dominates.
Iv. Consumer Behavior
There are a number of aspects of consumer behavior that are worth
considering, We start by analyzing strategic play by purchasers and link this
analysisto the auction literature.
A.Strategic Considerations
Consumers may know thefirm's pricing policy andin particular, that
R2 < R1• es it pay for a consumer in period 1 to wait for period 2, knowing
that by doing so he maybeable to purchasethe good at a lower price? The
decision depends on. the number of rival customers.
Suppose that a buyer has located a gown in period 1 that she values at
V >R1. If she buysthe dress, she earns rent =v—R1'Alternatively, she
canwait until period 2 hoping that no others will get there first. Themore
potential customers there are in the market, the lower is the probability that
the gown will remain on the rack into the next period. If the buyerpasses up
thegownthistime, there are N —1other customers who might beat her to it—33—






R1(1 —1/2N)> V(1 —1/N)
since R1 =2R2.
As N goes to infinity, the left side goes to R1 and the right to V.
So the consumer waits if R1 > V. But R1 > V precludes buying the good in
period 1 anyway, so for sufficiently large N, strategic behavior is not an
issue. There are too many others around who can beat this customer to it.
She buys it when she finds it.17 The argument is reinforced if some of this
period's buyers might obtain the good first.
On the other hand, as N goes to 1 it is certain that the consumer
behaves strategically because R1/2 > 0. The consumer is sure to get it next
period since she has no competition so he might as well wait for a lower
price. Thus, strategic behavior is not an issue when there is a large number
of potential buyers, but may be important when only a few individuals are even
potentially interested in the good.18
If goods are not unique, then without time preference, strategic behavior
results in an equilibrium that is identical to that of the one—period problem.
The reason is that all buyers gain if no sales are made in period 1. Since
the good is not unique, all are satisfied in period 2 at a lower price (R2 <
R1),No buyerhas any incentive to purchase in period 1.Of course,ifthe
sellerknows this, then he can infer nothing from the fact that no one bought
in period 1. As such, his problem is like the one—period problem so the
solution is Rt =1/2.Given that solution, nostrategic waiting occurs.—34.-
Theoriginal solution (2/3, 1/3, 2/3) is restored if some buyers have
high time preferences for the good.(A calculator that produces services over
time provides more utility, the sooner it is acquired.) Then at least some
buyers have an incentive to deviate from the waiting strategy. The initial
"no waiting" equilibrium is restored when some buyers have sufficiently high
time preference to buy in period 1. This requires V —
R1>(VR2)/(I +r)
where r is the discount rate. For r sufficiently large, a sale in period
1 is guaranteedwhen V >R1• Then the solution reverts to setting R2
R1
so that strategic waiting is not an issue. Since price does not fall over
time, nothing is gained by waiting.
B. Auctions and Stochastic Arrival of Customers
One waytodeal with uncertainty aboutconsumerdemand is to hold an
auction.19 In fact, the solution to the basic problem is in many respects
simply a Dutch auction, where the price begins high and continues to fall
until a purchaser declares that he is willing to buy at that price. In the
case where the time horizon is long, so that the reduction in price is small
at each period, and where N is small so that consumers may behave strategic-
ally with respect to waiting time, the analysis is that of a traditional Dutch
auction.
There are two major differences between this analysis and the one that
pertains to the standard Dutch auction. The first is one of emphasis. This
analysis for the most part assumes that N is large and consequently ignores
most strategic behavior by consumers.20 It focuses instead on the rule that the
seller uses to choose the optimal size of the step as a function of the number
of bidders and their types (shoppers or buyers), and of the number of periods
in the horizon. Recall that the number of periods depends on the cost of
changing price because a period is defined as that time during which price—35—
does not change. If there were no cost to changing price, then the period
notionwouldbedispensed withandthe seller wouldchangeprice each timea
customerexamined the good.ThenR would movewithN only andtimewould
be irrelevant.
The second important difference is related. In a Dutch auction, there is
no reason to alter the size of the step once the process is in motion. That
is, once the seller selects an amount by which to lower price each time, no
new information appears until a buyer agrees to purchase the good, at which
pointit is too late to use that information. That is not true in the
retailercontext, nor is it truein this model. Although we have assumed
throughoutthat N is fixed, there is nothing in the setup of the problem
that precludes a stochastic N. In fact, for a given choice of R1i the




If N here is interpreted as the realization of N in period 1, then (9)
still holds as the optimum R2 (because the second periodN doesnot
enter). Thus, the retailer can alter his choice of R2, i.e., change the
size of the step in the Dutch auction, after having observed something from
the first period. Of course, the ability to do so changes the choice of
R1
because that problem now involves an integral over all possible realizations
of N.21 But the point is that the retail pricing policy has an additional
instrument that is useful in all cases where N is stochastic. That instru-
ment is the ability to select the size of the step after obtaining some
information.
There are at least two related reasons why a seller might choose a strict
retail pricing rule over some form of auction or haggling. The first, already—36—
mentioned,is that an auction may encourage strategic behavior on the part of
consumers that is absent when retail pricing is used. Forexample,consider
confronting every potential buyer with the maximum possible V and lowering
price very rapidly until the consumer agrees to purchase. Obviously, the
consumerwould wait untilP =0,knowing that the considerations that
preventedstrategicwaiting in the last section are not relevant with this
type of pricing behavior. The retail pricing method, where R1 is chosen and
fixed in advance, discourages strategic behavior byconsumers when thenumber
ofcustomersis sufficiently large. This suggests that retailing is more
likely to be used when there are a large number of anonymous buyers.
The second, and perhaps more compelling reason why large, impersonal
stores might prefer retailing to some form of haggling has to do with delega-
tion of authority. Even if no agency problems exist, it is not unreasonable
to believe that the management of a department store would not trust price
setting to low—paid retail clerks. Since buyers can always refuse to buy if
the price is too high, but can purchase if the price is too low, bad price
setting can result in losses to the firm even if those prices are only
randomly too high or too low. To avoid this adverse selection problem, the
firm may decide to have its experts announce a rigid price (or price rule)
that is posted. No haggling is permitted because the clerk who represents the
store may not be good at it. Agency problems reinforce this result.
This suggests that haggling is more likely to occur when the owner (who
is presumably the high quality price setter) is also the sales agent. Mom—
and—pop stores are more likely to bargain with their customers over price than
are large department stores, which use retail pricing almost exclusively.
There are some more subtle elements, special to this setup, that are not
generally part of the Eitch auction. First, with a IXitch auction, all bidders—37—
arepresent at the same time.Equivalently,22each may submit a binding sealed
bid.Inthe case of the former, it is necessary that customers examine the
good at the same time. The storyin thispaper allows individuals to arrive
at different times during each period. The first one to arrive who will pay
price R1 in period 1 (or R2 if it goes to period 2) gets the good. The
Dutch auction imposes the cost that a common meeting time must be found.
Retailpricing does not impose that cost because consumers can choose their
ownshoppingtime.
Sealed bids do not force a common meeting time, but they do create a
waitingperiod between the time that the bid is made and the winner is deter-
mined. This, too, is costly. For example, a woman bids on a dress for the
Ball and then sees another one before she learns whether she made the winning
bid on the first. Buying the second dress might leave her with two, but
failure to purchase might result in her having none.
V. Empirical Thoughts
The purpose of this theory is to provide some empirical implications on
pricing and transactions behavior as a function of some observable parameters.
There are a substantial number of predictions about pricing and time on the
shelf as a function of the number of customers per period, the type of custo-
mers (shoppers or buyers), the time horizon, interest rates, the durability of
the good, and the shape of the prior.
With the exception perhaps of the last, all of these have observable
analogues. The number of customers and general thinness of the market can be
proxied by the turnover rate for the good. E.g., houses that turn over more
rapidly are sold in markets with higher N. The type of customer, P, can be
measured by the proportion of individuals who examine a good relative to the—38—
numberthat actually buy it. The time horizon relates to the maximum number
of times that a price is changed before the good is taken of f the floor.
E.g.,bargain basements eventually give up on some goods. After how many
price reductions does this occur?
additionally, some state contingent behavior has been predicted. For
example, when goods are non—unique, theprice in period twothat follows a
successful period1differs in a specific way from the price that follows an
unsuccessful period 1. This relationship is observable and can be tested.
Similarly, the time distribution of transactions is related to the initial
priceandto the speed with which price falls over time. Again, both are
observable. Finally, more uncertainty in the prior implies a higher initial
price with more rapid decline. It also implies that at the optimal prices,
more goods are left unsold when the prior is diffuse. (Fewer men's suits are
left unsold than women's dresses.) A relationship between initial price, rate
of price decline, and proportion of unsold goods is predicted, and all are
observable.
VI. Summary and conclusion
Sellers must gauge the market any time they attempt to sell a new item.
Their attempt to do so and to learn from experience leads to pricing and
selling behavior that varies in predictable ways with some observable charac-
teristics of the market.
The major theme is that prices start high and fall as a function of time
on the shelf. The speed of that fall and the initial price itself increase as
the number of customers per unit of time increases, as the proportion of
customers who are "genuine buyers" as opposed to "window shoppers" increases,
and as prior uncertainty about the value of the good increases. The optimum—39—
price path implies that in the case considered, the probability of making a
sale is constant over time.
A number of additional predictions are obtained. First, diffuse priors
may result in higher initial prices and more rapid fall, but also in higher
average price and more goods left unsold. This might explain why women's
clothes carry a higher average price than men's, but are of lower average
"quality," even in a competitive market.
Second, goods that become obsolete more rapidly or are more susceptible
to fashion exhibjt lower initial prices as well as prices that fall more
rapidly with time on the shelf. Positive discount rates have a similar effect
on initial price, but riot the same effect on the rate of price fall.
Third, non—uniqueness of the good does not alter the solution. A
successful first period is followed by no change in the price, whereas an
unsuccessful first period results in the same price reduction as is warranted
when goods are unique.
Fourth, for nonstorable goods, or when spoiling the market is an issue,
the price reduction policy is the same but the initial price is lower than for
storable goods. It is higher than the price that a myopic seller of non—
durables would charge because even though the good is not storable, the
information derived from period 1 is of value.
Fifth, rigid price reduction policies used by bargain basements are
predicted under certain circumstances.
Finally,the paper examines strategic behavior by consumers andthe
relationshipbetweena retailer's pricing policy and D.itch auctions.—40—
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Footnotes
1Neither the questions ormethodology are entirely novel. The updating
procedure used is described in DeGroot (1970) and has been usedmore recently
by Grossman, Kilstrom, and Mirman (1975). Another line ofliterature, Bass
(1969),Bassand Bultzen (1982), Clark and Dolan (1984), andSpence (1982)
examinessome of these problems, but the focus is on cost conditions that
change over time, generally tied to some learning by doing. It ismy view
thatthe essence of the marketing problem that faces a firm thatintroduces a
new product is selecting a strategy in the face of uncertainty about the
demand for itsproduct.The evolution of prices and transactions over time is
morelikely to reflect learning about themarket than learning about producing
theproduct.Both models givedeclining prices over time, but in the case of
cost changes, myopic sellers charge prices that are too high (Bassand
Bultzen) whereas in the case of learning about demand, myopic sellerschoose
prices that are too low.
isuseful to recognize that F(V) is determined after the retailer
has seen the goodhimself.For example, retail sellers of dresses know that
they vary in price from $50 to $10,000. After having examined thegood, the
seller may know that a particular dress has a V between $500 and$1,000, but
he does not know the exact value within thatrange.
3This is different from the usual price discriminationproblem where the
demand curveofthe market is known, but no buyer will reveal where he ison
that demand curve. That problem is treated by Stokey (1981).
4me same solution is obtained if(2) is maximizedsimultaneously
choosingR1and R2 because of the time—consistent nature of the problem.—43—--
5Thispricing pattern resembles a Dutchauction.This is discussed in
greater detail below.
is an inaccurate assumption in some cases. For example, the demand
fortelephones depends on the number of others who can be called.
7mis result is obtained by Grossman, Kilstrom and Mirman (1975).
Although most of their work focuses on consumer learning, they show that an
experimenting monopolist always starts with a higher price than a non-.
experimenting one.
8Harrisand Raviv(1981a) consider the use of different types of pricing
mechanismswhen demand conditions are uncertain. Their "priority pricing"
scheme resembles an intertemporal price decline. They show that such a scheme
is optimal when capacity falls short of potential demand. That is the situa-
tion that is implicit in this setup because the unique good can be sold to
only one of many potential buyers.
9mis abstracts from shopping for the pure pleasure of it and fromany
information that might be useful in making future purchases.
10Note that an identical mechanism is at work in the labor market context
when trying to infer a worker's product/wage ratio from past transactions.
This is thesubject of Lazear (1984).
10nemight ask whether advertising the price could bring about an ex
postcompetitiveequilibrium.The answer is no. Consider a store that said
that itofferedpaintings for $300. Theconsumerwould not know whether that
isa low price for a prior distribution of V that lies, say, between $300
and $400 or a high price for a prior that lies between $200 and $300. This is
why the point of footnote 2, that the seller draws F(V) from some larger
distribution, and sees the narrower distribution before pricing, is important.—44—
Recently,Milgrom and Roberts (1984) have shown that a seller should use
price and the level of advertising to signal the quality of the good to the
consumer. That will not solve the problem here for t reasons: First, repeat
purchases play a crucial role in their story. Second, the distribution that
the seller sees before pricing differs from the one that the buyer sees before
entering the store. The buyer mustengagein some search before he knows even
the prior on Vonwhich the seller bases his pricing. Note, also, that by
definition, visthe price at which the buyer purchases the good and this
takesinto account theoptionofwalkingoutand examining the paintings in
thenext gallery.
2The derivative ismessyand without obvious intuitive appeal. However,









l3mayormaynot vary withN.If it does, then stability conditions
must be checked and equilibrium, if it exists, need not be unique.
14Second—handmarkets are ignored.
15Thesolution that price never rises after a successful period depends
critically on two assumptions. First, there are no contagion or network
effectsthatshift demand in period 2 relative to period 1. Second, thegroup
ofbuyers is homogeneous in the assessment of V.
16Thjs ignores one—period bargaining considerations.
7Theargument here is a special case of the more general one made by
Wilson (1977). Wilson shows that as the number of bidders gets large, a
sealed bid auction results in bids that are almost certain to be equal to the—45—
true reservation value. As will be pointed out below, the declining price
retail policy is like a titch auction, which is equivalent to a sealed bid
auction in fundamental respects. As such, the Wilson result is relevant in
this context.
l8 assumes that the seller ignores thestrategic behavior of
consumers. This assumption is troublesome, and without it, a pure strategy
equilibrium maynotexist.
19There is a large literature on auctions starting with Vickrey (1961).
rexploresthe ailocative arid profit implications of a number of different
kinds of auctions, including the second price and r.itch auction. A number of
recent papers have characterized the conditions under which various types of
auctions are efficient and profit—maximizing. Among those are Butters (1975),
Engelbrecht—Wiggans (1980), Harris and Raviv (1981b), Myerson (1981), and
Milgrom and Weber (1982).
20Most of the auction literature focuses on strategic behavior by consu-
mers in selecting a bid. An early example of this kind of analysis is Wilson
(1967), who examines what happens in an auction when one and only one party is
informed about the value of the good.
21The problem in (7) then becomes
N N N N N
MaxE[1 —p




1 1 2 1
where is the stochastic number of buyers in period t.
22See Riley andSamuelson(1981).